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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.·
14710

DON C. COFFEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of issuing
a bad check in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-505
(Supp. 1975).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury which
returned a verdict of guilty.

The Honorable Allen B.

Sorenson entered judgment on that verdict, and sentenced
appellant to an indeterminate term of not less than one
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an Order of this Court affirming
the judgment rendered below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 29, 1975, appellant negotiated with
W. Morris Ercanbrack for the sale of a load of cherries.
A deal was closed, and appellant paid for the cherries
by a check in the amount of $3,560.00 drawn on the Dixie
State Bank.

Both Mr. Ercanbrack and his son Randall

testified that appellant represented the check as good
at the time it was written
not post-dated.

(Tr:~l2,15)..

The check was

Appellant did not have at the time

the check was written sufficient funds to cover the
check (Tr. 6),. Mr • Ercanbrack has never received
payment in full on the check

(Tr~lO).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH ALL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-505 (Supp. 1975) pro-

vides that:·'.\
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"Any person who issues or passes
a check for • • • the purpose of
obtaining from any person • • •
any money, property or other thing
of value. • • knowing it will not
~e paid by the drawee and payment
is refused by the drawee, is guilty
of issuing a bad check."
It is undisputed that the evidence establishes the
issuing of a check for the purpose of obtaining property,
and the non-payment of the check by the drawee.

The

nub of the case is the sufficiency of the evidence to
establish the culpable mental state of the appellant.
It is clear from the above-quoted statute what culpable
mental state must be

established~

knowledge that the

check will not be paid by the drawee.
§

Utah Code Ann.

76-2-103(2) (Supp. 1975) provides that:
"A person acts knowingly.
with respect to a result of his
conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result."

If the evidence establishes that appellant was aware
that it was reasonably certain that his check would not
be paid by the drawee, the State will have met its
burden to establish all the elements of the offense.
In Points I and II of appellant's brief, it is
suggested that the State must prove both an "intent to
defraud" and a knowledge that the check would not be paid.
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If the intent to defraud is interpreted to mean something different from, or in addition to the knowledge that the check would not be paid, it is not' an
element of the offense and the State has no obligation
to prove it.

However, if a person obtains an item of

value from a person by means of a check that he
knows will not be paid, he manifests an intent to
deprive another of right, i.e. to procure something
by deception or artifice or to appropriate wrongfully.
In other words, he would manifest an intent to defraud.
People v. Griffith, 120 C.A.2d 873, 262 P.2d 355
(1953).

1

Under the facts of this case, therefore, proof

of a knowledge that the check would not be paid is
also proof of an intent to defraud.
Appellant contends that the evidence is
such that no reasonable juror could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant possessed the requisite
knowledge, and in support of his argument has
invoked a maxim

of statutory construction, inclusio

unius est exclusio.

The maxim, however, has no application

to the case.
Appellant is correct in his interpretation
of the present bad check statute.

It provides for no

presumption of knowledge fr.om the issuing of an insufficient
funds check.

However, the fact that such a presumption
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is not included in the statute does not exclude the
jury from inferring intent from appellant's acts.
The Utah Criminal Code provides for very few
evidentiary presumptions, and yet nearly every offense
is defined to include a culpable mental state as
an element.

Direct evidence on the mental state

of a criminal defendant is rarely available, and
consequently the jury must nearly always infer the
defendant's intent from his acts.

The legislature's

failure to include presumptions in the code cannot be
interpreted as an attempt to prevent the jury from
inferring intent.

Such a construction would largely

frustrate the purposes of the Criminal Code.
On appeal, this court will view the evidence,.
and the inferences to be fairly drawn therefrom, in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.

v. Schad, 24 U.2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970).

State

The un-

disputed facts of this case are that appellant issued
a check for a substantial amount of money.{ and represented
that the check was good at the time it was issued.

In

<·""

/'i.··~
.:''it
t

;;· .. ·

fact, appellant did not have sufficient funds or
credit with the bank on that date, and Mr. Ercanbrack
was unable to collect on the check despite a one month
effort to do so {Tr .10).

At the time of trial, nearly

one year after the event, Mr. Ercanbrack had still not

~ved
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On these facts, a reasonable jury would not
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt of appellant's
knowledge that the check would bounce.

On the contrary,

the inference that he knew seems inescapable.

A

number of statutes provide that a presumption of intent
to defraud arises from the issuing of an insufficient
funds check.

Utah Code Ann.

§

7-15-2, 1953, as

amended (Utah statute governing civil remedies for
bad checks); Utah Code Ann.

§

76-20-11, 1953, as

amended (Repealed Utah Criminal Code); Model Penal
Code .§224.5 (1962); and California Penal Code
§

476a(c) (1970).

The legislatures could not provide

for such presumptions unless the presumption had some basis
in fact.

If the legislatures can provide that the

issuance of an insufficient funds check gives rise
to a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds, a fortiori a jury can infer from the passing of
a particular bad check that an issuer had knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds.
Respondent submits that the evidence in this
case establishes appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and in the interest of justice, asks that the
judgment be affirmed.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS FULLY, FAIRLY
AND CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS' OF THE
CRIME, AND WERE NEITHER CONFUSING NOR CONTRADICTORY.
The premise of appellant's Point III on appeal
is that intent to defraud is different and distinguishable from knowledge that a check will not be paid by
the drawee.

As noted in Point I, supra, under the

':.:
'.,

.. ·;

'
facts of this case, proof · of knowledge that the clleck
would not pass is equivalent to proof of intent to
defraud.

Instruction No. 6 is clearly a proper

instruction on the elements of the crime because
it is cast in terms of the statute.
is not

distiiig~ishable

Instruction Mo. S

from No. 6 except that it uses the

term •intent to defraud".

No jury would find appellant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of having an intent
to defraud if they felt that appellant thought that
his check would pass.

Such knowledge would be clearly

inconsistent with a fraudulent intent.

The instructions,

considered as a whole, fully and fairly explain the
elements of the offense of issuing

a bad dheck.

Because Instructions Nos. 5 and 6 are reconcilable
and harmonious, they cannot be considered contradictory
or confusing.

As this court stated in State v. Hendricks,

123 Utah 267, 258 P.2d 452 (1953), instructions are to.
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be considered as a whole and reconciled whenever
possible.

It is only when instructions are hopelessly

in conflict that it can be said that a jury was
misled or confused.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the guilty verdict
was rendered by a properly instructed jury in
accordance with evidence.

Respondent asks that in

the interests of justice the judgment be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

Attorneys for Respondent
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